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THERE is a growing feeling that resources vital to sustain human 
life, such as fresh water, land and fossil fuels, are being used too 
fast to ensure our long-term presence on the planet. It seems 
obvious that nations should cooperate on this problem, and yet 
successful cross-border solutions and agreements are hard to find. 
Why don't we act for the common good more often? 
Look around the world and you can see instances of water-related 
inter-state tension and conflicts in many regions, including the 
Middle East (Jordan river basin, Tigris-Euphrates basin), Asia 
(Indus river), and Africa (the Nile). 
"Fish wars" have erupted sporadically, such as Europe's cod wars, 
and while these have been more contained, they could resurge 
amid decreasing stocks. In the same way, the shared resource of 
global climate continues to be threatened by the relentless burning 
of fossil fuels. 
Our degradation of the environment is ominous and much 
evidence points to a clear link between the scarcity of vital 
resources and conflict. One wonders, then, why world leaders 
failed to reach a substantive agreement on climate change at the 
Copenhagen summit in 2009; or why fishing and hunting quotas 
for endangered species are so hard to implement; or why the use 
and pollution of river basins is not better regulated. 
Explanations such as poor forecasting of resources, the short-term 
mindset of politicians, or simply the refusal to recognise the 
problem are usually given. 
However, what if these are not the real reasons and something 
more fundamental is at work? Game theory, an established way of 
modelling decisions involving conflict and cooperation, offers a 
way to seek answers. Traditionally, cross-border armed conflict 
over shared resources is sidelined in game theory simulations on 
the grounds that it is deemed more costly to a nation state than 
cooperation. 
For example, imagine a depletable natural resource – such as a 
water basin – jointly owned by two countries. Both drain it for 
drinking, sanitation, irrigation and so on. Draining too quickly will 
result in it drying out. Most game theory work says that working for 
the common good is the optimum choice for both nations. But this 
does not square with conflicts we see, or the widely held view that 
more are inevitable. 
To address this, I designed a simulation that allowed the use of 
violence to control resources (The Rand Journal of Economics, vol 
45, p 521). In a world where force is a very real option and history 
suggests it is used or threatened more often than we might hope, 
this seemed reasonable. 
The outcome offers an explanation for the gap between theory and 
reality. Having constructed a game-theoretical model, I found that 
when conflict is allowed it always occurred, but only when 
resources become heavily depleted. 
And, crucially, the very expectation of impending conflict led to 
non-cooperation in the short term and sped up depletion of the 
common resource. I would argue that this resource-grabbing tallies 
with what we see in much of the world, be it disputes over fossil 
fuels, fresh water, land or marine resources. 
Are there any historical examples that illustrate this effect of 
"conflict expectation" and more rapid resource use? Possibly. The 
demise of the first society on Easter Island, as documented by 
Jared Diamond in his book Collapse, is salient. It is thought 
Polynesians were first to colonise this isolated, 160-square-
kilometre Pacific island around AD 900. At its peak, 30,000 people 
may have lived there. 
Their society was organised in hierarchical clans, peacefully 
competing for supremacy by displaying vast stone statues. To 
move them, the tallest trees needed to be felled and used as 
rollers. Deforestation resulted, says Diamond. Instead of reaching 
agreements, the islanders rapidly devastated their lands, and by 
the time the first Europeans arrived in 1722, no tree taller than 3 
metres stood there. 
An ecological disaster and dramatic deprivation must have 
occurred. According to Diamond, a sort of military coup took place, 
sparking prolonged conflict. It is reasonable to imagine that the 
clans realised that trees – also vital for things like fishing boats – 
were in short supply, and so grabbed what they could before the 
inevitable violence. 
The conclusions I've drawn on the impact of over-use of resources 
today on future conflict are purely theoretical. So with economists 
Giacomo De Luca and Dominic Spengler of the University of York, 
UK, I am designing a lab experiment to see whether humans in a 
controlled environment do deplete resources faster when given the 
possibility to use violent control. Our early findings point that way. 
Such evidence would shed new light on the failure of international 
cooperation over the preservation of the environment. 
What's next? I have not yet considered human ingenuity in 
adapting to a changing environment. Whether that will be sufficient 
to achieve a sustainable path depends on the rate of depletion 
versus adaptation. 
Inevitable conflict and accelerated use of depleted resources may 
be more likely to become a reality within weak states and in the 
international arena, where weak institutions are more likely. For 
example, signing a carbon emissions treaty today does not commit 
a country beyond mild sanctions that the global community may or 
may not impose. In addition, a change in government in a powerful 
country is sufficient for a treaty to be revised, curbing the 
incentives of others to join. 
All this reinforces the need for stronger institutions and international 
bodies if we are to avert a tragedy of the commons in a violent world. 
Sadly, this will require overcoming the very problem we are trying to 
solve: a lack of international cooperation. 
